MCP server · Audited from source
bla MCP server
by qybaihe/blaMIT licenceAudited 12 Nov 2026 · source 37cf6aa5f948
Is it safe? No — BLOCK, grade F (38/100). It exposes 33 tools: 30 read, 3 write and 0 destructive. The audit recorded 39 findings (0 critical, 5 high, 14 medium, 18 low). Maintainer's description: 🛡️ BLA (Blind LLM Agents) — Adversarial defense shield that protects binaries, Electron apps, JS bundles, Python, and WebAssembly against AI reverse-engineering agents like REA. Poison -> Exhaust -> Hallucinate.
Cite
Cite this page
ModelsAtlas. “bla MCP server (qybaihe/bla)”. Retrieved 12 Nov 2026. https://modelsatlas.com/mcp/qybaihe/bla
Why this is BLOCK. The audit found 0 critical and 5 high findings; the most severe is Prompt injection at docs/readme/README_fa.md:7. Each finding is listed below with its file and line.
Why this page is still public. People search for this server by name. Hiding it would leave them with the README's word alone; here they see what the code does. We list it so you can decide, and we do not show connect commands for BLOCK servers.
Trust audit
Audit 0.4.1 · full source read 12 Nov 2026
39 findings, listed below with the file and line each was found on. Grade A needs a sandboxed behavioural run too; this audit read the source only.
What the source does
- FilesystemDeclared6 observations
- NetworkDeclared10 observations
- ShellDeclared5 observations
- DependenciesNot pinnedSome ranges float
- SecretsFoundSee the findings
Findings (39)
Sorted by severity · the 25 most severe of 39 are listed
HIGHPrompt injectionprompt.zero_width · docs/readme/README_fa.md:7
### یک MCP واحد برای دفاع از فایلهای باینری، برنامهها و رفتار زمان اجرا در برابر مهندسی معکوس هوش مصنوعی.
- Why
- invisible characters in instruction text
- Fix
- strip non-printing characters
HIGHPrompt injectionprompt.zero_width · docs/readme/README_fa.md:9
**ویژگیهایی را که ساختهاید ایمن کنید. ایجنتهایی را که قصد کلون کردن آن را دارند در سطح باینری کور کنید.**
- Why
- invisible characters in instruction text
- Fix
- strip non-printing characters
HIGHPrompt injectionprompt.zero_width · docs/readme/README_fa.md:17
[شروع سریع](#quick-start) · [نحوه کار BLA](#how-bla-works) · [چه چیزهایی را میتوانید محافظت کنید](#what-you-can-protect) · [نمونهها و بنچمارکها](#showcases) · [سوالات متداول (FAQ)](#faq) · [مستندات](#
- Why
- invisible characters in instruction text
- Fix
- strip non-printing characters
HIGHPrompt injectionprompt.zero_width · docs/readme/README_fa.md:40
BLA ایجنت شما را به ابزارهای محافظت از باینریهای بومی، برنامههای JavaScript و Electron، ماژولهای WebAssembly، بایتکد Python، پایگاههای داده SQLite و مدلهای هوش مصنوعی متصل میکند.
- Why
- invisible characters in instruction text
- Fix
- strip non-printing characters
HIGHPrompt injectionprompt.zero_width · docs/readme/README_fa.md:46
### راهاندازی ایجنت
- Why
- invisible characters in instruction text
- Fix
- strip non-printing characters
MEDIUMInventory / provenanceinv.binary · challenge/v6/hardened/core.wasm.gz
core.wasm.gz
- Why
- a compiled or binary member cannot be reviewed from source
- Fix
- ship source, or explain the binary in the README
MEDIUMInventory / provenanceinv.binary · challenge/v6/src/core.wasm
core.wasm
- Why
- a compiled or binary member cannot be reviewed from source
- Fix
- ship source, or explain the binary in the README
MEDIUMInventory / provenanceinv.binary · challenge/v8/hardened/core.wasm.gz
core.wasm.gz
- Why
- a compiled or binary member cannot be reviewed from source
- Fix
- ship source, or explain the binary in the README
MEDIUMInventory / provenanceinv.binary · challenge/v9/hardened/core.wasm.gz
core.wasm.gz
- Why
- a compiled or binary member cannot be reviewed from source
- Fix
- ship source, or explain the binary in the README
MEDIUMNetwork egressnet.beacon_words · challenge/archive/v5/bla-crackme.cjs:2902
canaryTokens: ["AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_5EDF_0", "sk-canary-honeypot-do-not-exfiltrate-5edf-3bff6d50", "ghp_canaryHoneypotSyntheticToken5edfe9bc963b", "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_5EDF_3", "sk-canary-honeypot-d
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMNetwork egressnet.beacon_words · challenge/archive/v6-tiered-protect/artifacts/L1.cjs:1508
canaryTokens: ["AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_C262_0", "sk-canary-honeypot-do-not-exfiltrate-c262-a204f633", "ghp_canaryHoneypotSyntheticTokenc262fb87100f", "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_C262_3"],
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMNetwork egressnet.beacon_words · challenge/archive/v6-tiered-protect/artifacts/L2.cjs:2033
canaryTokens: ["AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_8E4B_0", "sk-canary-honeypot-do-not-exfiltrate-8e4b-f5848990", "ghp_canaryHoneypotSyntheticToken8e4b0b902106", "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_8E4B_3", "sk-canary-honeypot-d
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMNetwork egressnet.beacon_words · challenge/archive/v6-tiered-protect/artifacts/L3.cjs:2554
canaryTokens: ["AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_86DF_0", "sk-canary-honeypot-do-not-exfiltrate-86df-063da3ae", "ghp_canaryHoneypotSyntheticToken86df7ae95fdd", "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_86DF_3", "sk-canary-honeypot-d
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMNetwork egressnet.beacon_words · challenge/v6/hardened/vault.cjs:2619
canaryTokens: ["AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_366D_0", "sk-canary-honeypot-do-not-exfiltrate-366d-f0672196", "ghp_canaryHoneypotSyntheticToken366dbd288064", "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE_366D_3", "sk-canary-honeypot-d
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMObfuscation / stealthobf.anti_debug · src/shields/formats/native.ts:1151
"kernel32.dll\0DeviceIoControl\0IsDebuggerPresent\0CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent\0",
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMObfuscation / stealthobf.base64_blob · challenge/archive/v5/bla-crackme.cjs:528
const _bindMatrix_e88 = "0NUUKvoPBNyFBIfD+sT7nwRR42RdpCfPFQHVH9Vfg6DRRCJckQ+XjxlCvRopbjb2ZsBnP86gzQzhum5dWUO5tpdqaknUg8w9qi2eqljLl9pQ1Dgx77OxVjnzyjQADQGTG6514TgSEngvRUeHpDLWacmg6y0hGbWtAt748l32zss3qao
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMHard-coded secretssecret.generic · tests/encrypt-strings.test.ts:29
Excerpt withheld: it is a secret, and we never print one.
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMHard-coded secretssecret.generic · tests/plaintext-secret-lint.test.ts:14
Excerpt withheld: it is a secret, and we never print one.
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
MEDIUMHard-coded secretssecret.generic · tests/runtime-memory-diff-shield.test.ts:100
Excerpt withheld: it is a secret, and we never print one.
- Why
- No further detail recorded for this rule.
- Fix
- —
LOWCode injectioncode.deserialize · tests/python-pyc-weave.test.ts:86
code = marshal.loads(raw[16:])
- Why
- deserialises untrusted bytes into live objects
- Fix
- use json or yaml.safe_load
LOWCode injectioncode.eval_exec · tests/exhaustion-suite.test.ts:39
const fn = new Function(`${flood.code}; return typeof ${nameMatch![1]} === "function";`);- Why
- evaluates text as code
- Fix
- remove; use a parser or a dispatch table
LOWCode injectioncode.eval_exec · tests/opaque-predicates.test.ts:9
return new Function("k", `return (${expr});`)(k) as boolean;- Why
- evaluates text as code
- Fix
- remove; use a parser or a dispatch table
LOWCode injectioncode.eval_exec · tests/runtime-memory-diff-shield.test.ts:112
const readerFn = new Function(
- Why
- evaluates text as code
- Fix
- remove; use a parser or a dispatch table
LOWCode injectioncode.eval_exec · tests/runtime-memory-diff-shield.test.ts:160
const runFn = new Function(
- Why
- evaluates text as code
- Fix
- remove; use a parser or a dispatch table
Tools it exposes
33 declared in source · 0 destructive
| Tool | What it does | Risk |
|---|---|---|
bla_rea_drift | Run the REA constant-drift harness (scripts/verify-rea-constants.mjs). This is NOT red-team evidence. Absent sibling REA → status unverified (never a silent pass). | write |
bla_run_lookup | Read-only correlation of a prior harden run: load bla-harden-summary.json by path or output directory, optionally asserting a run_id. Unsigned summaries only — never treats absence as success. | write |
shield-against-rea | Audit a build artifact for REA exposure, apply BLA | write |
bla-counter-rea | Evaluate REA reverse-engineering exposure and plan defensive hardening for a software artifact. | read |
bla-harden-project | One-sentence Counter-REA hardening: discover every protectable build artifact under a project directory and run bla_harden (audit→defend→verify, bankrupt profile). | read |
bla-hardening-workflow | Step-by-step release hardening checklist using bla_inspect_release, bla_audit, bla_protect, and bla_verify. | read |
bla-weave-decoy | Plan weave-decoy hardening: read bla://directives/weave-decoy, call bla_weave_plan, then bla_harden with weave_decoys:true. Defensive only. | read |
bla_audit | Pre-flight REA exposure and vulnerability audit. Simulates REA static/semantic passes on a target file or directory (JS/TS, Electron .asar, WASM, Python .py/.pyc, Native ELF/Mach-O/PE, ZIP/APK) and estimates attacker Claude/GPT token and dollar cost. | read |
bla_benchmark | Runs the Counter-REA Showcase Benchmark suite and returns Before vs. After metrics. | read |
bla_defend | One-click Counter-REA full defense hardening pipeline. Runs release source-map exposure inspection, 16-vector REA vulnerability audit, Resource-Exhaustion + Model-Misjudgment shield injection (default: bankrupt preset), and mathematical invariant verification in a single call. | read |
bla_doctor | Checks readiness of all BLA protection engines and agent MCP registrations. | read |
bla_emit_headers | Emits compile-time native defense headers for C/C++ (bla_shield.h), Rust (bla_shield.rs), or Go (bla_shield.go) to defeat Ghidra/Hopper/IDA and REA native binary analyzers. | read |
bla_encrypt_strings | Encrypt sensitive string literals in panel.html / license.cjs with a seed-derived XOR keystream and inject a runtime decrypt stub. Reuses SeededPrng.derive(\ | read |
bla_init | Creates a starter bla.config.json in a project directory for zero-argument | read |
bla_inspect_release | Read-only local source-map and symbol exposure scan for build directories and release artifacts. | read |
bla_lint | DEFAULT packaging-footgun gate scan for a project directory (or file). Runs every R1–R7 bankrupt refuse lint plus lane-independence and panel-derive discovery in one call — same engines as the individual bla_lint_* tools / | read |
bla_lint_bind_scope | Read-only lint for bla-bind-scope/v1. Refuses when public≠true, constraints empty, dates/domains invalid, hidden fields present, or bind-scope.json exists without BLA_BIND_SCOPE_CHECK in the entry. Writes nothing. | read |
bla_lint_integrity_coverage | Read-only integrity coverage matrix lint (Direction-3). Evaluates bla-integrity-coverage/v1 JSON (path to file or directory discovering integrity-coverage.json). Refuses when full coverage / anti-single-point / hashes / connectivity fail. Hash-only — no guessing. Writes nothing. | read |
bla_lint_js_aes_unwrap | Read-only JS AES wrap-key unwrap lint (same engine as CLI | read |
bla_lint_js_wasm_hydrate_dump | Read-only JS←WASM hydrate param-dump lint (same engine as CLI | read |
bla_lint_lanes | Read-only heuristic lane-independence footgun lint (same engine as CLI | read |
bla_lint_panel_derive | Read-only panel-derive ABI lint (same engine as CLI | read |
bla_lint_plaintext_secrets | Read-only lint for cleartext sensitive literals (FLAG{...}, high-entropy tokens, PEM headers, long hex/base64, derive key-name strings) in panel.html / license.cjs. Bankrupt packaging gates refuse error findings unless allow_plaintext_string. URLs are warning-class. Writes nothing. | read |
bla_lint_seal | Read-only seal-commitment lint (same engine as CLI | read |
bla_lint_wasm_params | Read-only WASM param/cipher carrier lint (same engine as CLI | read |
bla_lint_wasm_seal_xor_known_plaintext | Read-only WASM+seal.revision XOR known-plaintext lint (same engine as CLI | read |
bla_lint_wasm_xor_mask_sidecar | Read-only WASM XOR-mask sidecar lint (same engine as CLI | read |
bla_protect | Injects BLA | read |
bla_verify | Verifies a BLA-protected artifact against REA | read |
directory | Project or build directory (default: .) | read |
target_path | Path to the build artifact or directory | read |
weave-decoy-directives | Chinese-friendly weave-decoy theory + executor checklist for Counter-REA agents (defensive only). | read |
weave-decoy-doc | Pointer to repository theory pack ${WEAVE_DECOY_DOC_PATH} | read |
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Audit history
- ✕BLOCK F 38 / 100
First audit ·
37cf6aa5f948
README badge
Badges show the current verdict, BLOCK included
A badge cannot be hidden by the maintainer while the verdict is BLOCK. Fix the findings, push, and the re-audit updates it.
Questions about bla MCP server
What is the bla MCP server?
What tools does bla expose?
Is bla safe to connect to an agent?
What credentials does bla need?
How current is this page?
I already installed bla. What should I do?
Can the verdict change?
Sources
- qybaihe/bla on GitHub — the source we read, its licence, stars and activityObserved · 12 Nov 2026
- ModelsAtlas trust audit — BLOCK verdict for commit 37cf6aa5f948Observed · 12 Nov 2026
Spotted something wrong? Report a correction · Methodology
Keep going in your AI
Opens with this page as the source. We add nothing else to the prompt.
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