Atlas / MCP servers / mateuszingano / airlock-rls-mcp

airlock-rls-mcpSAFE

mcp/mateuszingano/airlock-rls-mcp

MCP server: let Cursor / Claude Code check a Supabase app for an exposed service_role key and broken RLS while it builds it

Verdict
SAFE
Grade
B
Trust score
89 /100
Exposed tools
2 2r · 0w · 0d
Transport
—
License
MIT
Stars
0
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

Let Cursor, Claude Code, or any MCP client check a Supabase app for leaks while it builds it. It catches the most common vibe-coding footgun: a service_role key shipped to the browser, and Row Level Security that's off or wide open.

The engine is Airlock RLS (npm i airlock-rls), the CI gate for Supabase RLS. This package is a thin MCP wrapper around it.

Two tools

`scan_site_for_exposed_key` — give it a deployed URL. It reads the page and its JS bundles for an exposed Supabase service_role key (a service_role JWT or an sb_secret_... key). No database, no credentials, just the public URL. A hit means anyone who reads it bypasses every RLS policy. It never prints the full key.

`audit_supabase_rls` — give it a Postgres connection string. It fails on RLS-off tables, permissive (always-true) policies, and anon/authenticated tenant leaks. It reads only catalog metadata (pg_tables, pg_policies, grants), never your row data, so a read-only role is enough.

Add it to your MCP client

{
"mcpServers": {
"airlock": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "airlock-rls-mcp"]
}
}
}

That's the same block for Cursor (~/.cursor/mcp.json), Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json) and other MCP clients. With Claude Code:

claude mcp add airlock -- npx -y airlock-rls-mcp

Then ask the agent things like "scan https://myapp.com for an exposed Supabase key" or "audit the RLS on this database" and it calls the tools.

Requirements

Node.js 18 or newer.

Develop

npm install
npm run smoke   # starts the server and checks both tools are advertised

More

Guides on Supabase RLS, a live cross-tenant demo, and the hosted Airlock Monitor (continuous checks of your live database): shipsealed.com

License

MIT © Mateus Zingano

Read from source at commit f4645a32fd6aOBSERVED · 2026-10-13
02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control.

claude-code
claude mcp add airlock-rls-mcp -- npx -y [email protected]
claude-desktop
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "airlock-rls-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "[email protected]"
      ]
    }
  }
}
03

Exposed tools (2)

2 read · 0 write · 0 destructive.

ToolRiskDescription
audit_supabase_rlsreadAudit a Supabase/Postgres database
scan_site_for_exposed_keyreadScan a DEPLOYED website
04

Trust audit

SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryPASS
L1Static analysis of the codePASS
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfacePASS
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
none-observed
Network
none-observed
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
not all pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (1)

LOWSupply chain · supply.unpinned · CWE-829, CWE-1357
package.json
airlock-rls
Why it matters. 1 dependency range(s) float
Fix. pin exact versions or ship a lockfile

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-13 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha f4645a32fd6afull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/mateuszingano__airlock-rls-mcp.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
05

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-13f4645a32fd6aSAFEB89first audit
06

Questions

What is the airlock-rls-mcp MCP server?

MCP server: let Cursor / Claude Code check a Supabase app for an exposed service_role key and broken RLS while it builds it

What tools does airlock-rls-mcp expose?

2 in total: 2 read-only, 0 that write, and 0 that can delete or overwrite. Every one is listed on this page with its risk.

Is airlock-rls-mcp safe to connect to an agent?

The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean server reads B.

What credentials does airlock-rls-mcp need?

No credential environment variables were found in its source, so it appears to need none.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (f4645a32fd6a), read on 2026-10-13. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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