Atlas / MCP servers / fixed-width / glass

glassCAUTION

mcp/fixed-width/glass

MCP server: build → see → interact → debug loop over native GUI apps

Verdict
CAUTION
Grade
C
Trust score
77 /100
Exposed tools
—
Transport
streamable-http
License
Apache-2.0
Stars
18
01

Overview

From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.

[](https://github.com/fixed-width/glass/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/fixed-width/glass)

Give your coding agent hands for the app it's building — launch it, drive it, and verify the result, without burning a screenshot on every step.

A Rust MCP server that gives an AI coding agent a closed build → see → interact → debug loop over external native GUI applications.

glass lets an agent launch a GUI app, capture what is on screen, inject mouse and keyboard input, read the app's logs, and detect visual changes — so a coding agent can build and debug UI applications independently instead of asking the user "does this look right?".

glass drives apps as an external black box, so it works with any native GUI app regardless of toolkit or language. It has two Linux backends (X11 and Wayland), a Windows backend, an Android backend (an AVD emulator, driven over adb from any host), an iOS backend (native apps in the Simulator over xcrun simctl, with input and the accessibility tree via idb_companion, including a two-finger pinch), and a macOS backend, behind a platform-agnostic core.

The same input tools work across backends. Default Linux displays and mobile emulators keep input separate from your desktop; native Windows and macOS currently share it. glass_capabilities with scope: "session" reports click, scroll and text support and whether each can affect your desktop.

See it

An agent building a GUI app runs it under glass, reproduces a bug from the accessibility tree (no screenshots), fixes the code, and re-verifies — the loop it otherwise can't close on its own. Try it yourself.

Try it

Read from source at commit f47d249042b1OBSERVED · 2026-10-11
02

Connect

Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control.

claude-code
claude mcp add glass-interaction-fixture -- npx -y [email protected]
claude-desktop
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "glass-interaction-fixture": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "[email protected]"
      ]
    }
  }
}
03

Trust audit

CAUTIONgrade C · trust 77/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.

LayerWhat it checksResult
L0Provenance & inventoryWARN
L1Static analysis of the codeWARN
L2Instruction surface (what it tells the agent)PASS
L3Class-specific surfaceWARN
L4Behavioural (sandbox)SKIPPED

What the source does

Filesystem
declared (6 observation(s))
Network
declared (5 observation(s))
Shell
none-observed
Dependencies
pinned
Secrets in source
none-found

Findings (20)

MEDIUMInventory / provenance · inv.binary · CWE-1104
packaging/macos/AppIcon.icns
AppIcon.icns
Why it matters. a compiled or binary member cannot be reviewed from source
Fix. ship source, or explain the binary in the README
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
crates/glass-ios/src/idb/client.rs:375
Endpoint::from_static("http://127.0.0.1:0").connect_lazy()
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
crates/glass-mcp/src/update/mod.rs:621
let src = ReleaseSource::with_base("http://127.0.0.1:1");
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
crates/glass-mcp/src/update/mod.rs:1206
let src = ReleaseSource::with_base("http://127.0.0.1:1");
MEDIUMNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
crates/glass-mcp/src/update/release.rs:369
let base = "http://127.0.0.1:8080";
MEDIUMObfuscation / stealth · obf.zero_width · CWE-506, CWE-94
crates/glass-mcp/src/tools/snapshot_diff/tests.rs:158
"name=é👩💻 e\u{301}\r\n".repeat(80),
MEDIUMAuth / authz · mcp.remote_no_auth · CWE-287, CWE-862
streamable-http
Why it matters. a network transport with no auth environment variable found
Fix. require a token
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/glass-a11y-linux/tests/web_probe.rs:63
"file://{}/../../examples/web-role-fixture/index.html",
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/glass-a11y-linux/tests/web_probe.rs:834
"file://{}/../../examples/interaction-fixture/index.html?case={geometry}",
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/glass-a11y-linux/tests/web_probe.rs:933
"file://{}/../../examples/interaction-fixture/index.html?case=large-form",
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/glass-core/tests/role_support_doc.rs:15
"/../../docs/reference/a11y-roles.md"
LOWFilesystem / path · fs.traversal · CWE-22, CWE-59
crates/glass-macos/src/bundle.rs:192
for evil in ["../../etc/evil", "/etc/evil", "sub/exec", "Demo/"] {
LOWNetwork egress · net.raw_ip · CWE-200, CWE-319
CHANGELOG.md:795
that granting Screen Recording relaunches the app), and the `http://127.0.0.1:7300/` endpoint —
LOWObfuscation / stealth · obf.decode_call · CWE-506, CWE-94
tools/interaction-bench/measurement.py:148
metrics["image_decoded_bytes"] += len(base64.b64decode(data, validate=True))
LOWObfuscation / stealth · obf.zero_width · CWE-506, CWE-94
tools/interaction-bench/tests/test_snapshot_revisions.py:37
current = "first\r\n新👩💻 e\u0301\nduplicate\nfinal"
LOWObfuscation / stealth · obf.zero_width · CWE-506, CWE-94
tools/interaction-bench/tests/test_snapshot_revisions.py:39
{"start": 1, "delete": 1, "insert": ["新👩💻 e\u0301\n"]},
LOWObfuscation / stealth · obf.zero_width · CWE-506, CWE-94
tools/interaction-bench/tests/test_snapshot_revisions.py:180
original = [randomizer.choice(["same\n", "e\u0301\n", "雪\r\n", "👩💻\n"]) for _ in range(20)]
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.authority_framing · CWE-94, CWE-1427
CHANGELOG.md:205
`--yes` skips the confirmation prompt. It never asks for elevated privileges — if the install
LOWPrompt injection · prompt.credential_read · CWE-94, CWE-1427
docs/how-to/build-from-source.md:51
1. Open **Keychain Access**.
Why it matters. asks the agent to read credentials
LOWInventory / provenance · mcp.no_tools_extracted · CWE-1104
server.json
Why it matters. the tool list is enumerated at runtime by tools/list, not declared in source
Fix. the page says so rather than showing an empty table

Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.

Audited 2026-10-11 · audit v0.4.1 · source sha f47d249042b1full audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/fixed-width__glass.json · Report an issue / request a re-scan
04

Audit history

Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.

DateSourceVerdictGradeScoreChange
2026-10-11f47d249042b1CAUTIONC77first audit
05

Questions

What is the glass MCP server?

MCP server: build → see → interact → debug loop over native GUI apps

Is glass safe to connect to an agent?

With care. The audit graded it C (77/100) and found 20 things worth knowing before you trust this server, listed below with the exact line each was found on.

What credentials does glass need?

No credential environment variables were found in its source, so it appears to need none.

How does glass run?

It speaks streamable-http, so it runs as a service you connect to over the network. It is published on npm as glass-interaction-fixture at 1.0.0.

How current is this page?

The grade is for one exact copy of the source (f47d249042b1), read on 2026-10-11. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.

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