Obsidian MultivaultCAUTION
Multi-vault and multiuser Obsidian MCP
Overview
From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.
An MCP server that gives Claude read/write access to Obsidian vaults that live on a VPS — built for multiple vaults and multiple users from a single deployment. Everyone shares one server; each person is routed to their own private vault by the passphrase they log in with (HTTP mode) or by the vault path Claude Desktop launches with (stdio mode). The server runs on the VPS with direct filesystem access to the vaults.
Features
- Multi-vault, multi-user — one server serves many people, each mapped to their own vault. In HTTP
mode everyone adds the same connector URL and their distinct login passphrase decides which vault they get; in stdio mode each Claude Desktop passes its own vault path.
- Two transports from one codebase — stdio over
ssh(Claude Desktop) and an OAuth-protected
Streamable HTTP endpoint (Claude mobile/web/desktop remote connectors).
- Read/write tools with strict path safety — vault-relative paths only;
.., absolute paths,
symlink escapes, and null bytes are rejected; writes limited to an extension allowlist. Optional --read-only and per-user readOnly.
- Self-hosted OAuth 2.1 — passphrase login, PKCE, JWT access tokens, and Dynamic Client
Registration, so no third-party auth service is needed.
- Single-file deploy — esbuild bundles everything to one
dist/index.js; deploy is a one-file copy.
There is no SSH library inside the server — SSH is only the transport Claude Desktop uses to start it and exchange JSON-RPC. Part of a "centralise the vaults on the VPS" setup:
Mac VPS (always-on) ┌ Obsidian app ──(obsidian-remote-ssh plugin)── SSH ─▶ Go daemon ─┐ │ ├─▶ a user's vault └ Claude Desktop ─(ssh stdio → node index.js)── SSH ─▶ THIS server┘ ▲ Hermes agent (direct fs) ``
a1dc25ee8f62OBSERVED · 2026-10-08Connect
Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control. Replace the environment placeholders with a token scoped to the least it needs.
claude mcp add obsidian-multivault-mcp --env MCP_AUTH_PASSPHRASE=${MCP_AUTH_PASSPHRASE} --env MCP_JWT_SECRET=${MCP_JWT_SECRET} --env MCP_NO_AUTH=${MCP_NO_AUTH} -- npx -y [email protected]{
"mcpServers": {
"obsidian-multivault-mcp": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"[email protected]"
],
"env": {
"MCP_AUTH_PASSPHRASE": "${MCP_AUTH_PASSPHRASE}",
"MCP_JWT_SECRET": "${MCP_JWT_SECRET}",
"MCP_NO_AUTH": "${MCP_NO_AUTH}"
}
}
}
}Exposed tools (9)
4 read · 4 write · 1 destructive. Blast radius: 1 tool can delete or overwrite — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling this one.
| Tool | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|
append_to_note | read | |
create_note | write | |
delete_note | destructive | |
edit_note | write | |
list_notes | read | |
move_note | write | |
read_note | read | |
search_notes | read | |
write_note | write |
Trust audit
CAUTIONgrade B · trust 86/100 Install with care. The audit found things worth knowing before you trust its output.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | WARN |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | PASS |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | WARN |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- declared (4 observation(s))
- Network
- declared (10 observation(s))
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- not all pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (13)
const redirectUri = "http://127.0.0.1:45999/cb";
const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(new URL(`http://127.0.0.1:${PORT_A}/mcp`));MCP_PUBLIC_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${PORT_B}`,const base = `http://127.0.0.1:${PORT_B}`;const redirectUri = "http://127.0.0.1:45678/callback";
delete_note
arguments: { path: "../../../../etc/passwd" },show("traversal (should error)", await client.callTool({ name: "read_note", arguments: { path: "../../../etc/passwd" } }));arguments: { path: "../../../../etc/passwd" },@modelcontextprotocol/sdk, cors, express, jose, zod, @types/cors, @types/express, @types/node
logs and the token. The server refuses to start if two users share a passphrase.
terminal** — sudo cannot read a password through a non-interactive one-liner.
cat > /etc/obsidian-multivault-mcp.env <<EOF
Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
a1dc25ee8f62full audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/bepitulaz__obsidian-multivault.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-08 | a1dc25ee8f62 | CAUTION | B | 86 | first audit |
Questions
What is the Obsidian Multivault MCP server?
Multi-vault and multiuser Obsidian MCP
What tools does Obsidian Multivault expose?
9 in total: 4 read-only, 4 that write, and 1 that can delete or overwrite (delete_note). Every one is listed on this page with its risk.
Is Obsidian Multivault safe to connect to an agent?
With care. The audit graded it B (86/100) and found 13 things worth knowing before you trust this server, listed below with the exact line each was found on. Separately from the audit: 1 of its tools can destroy data, so scope the token you give it to what you actually need.
What credentials does Obsidian Multivault need?
It reads MCP_AUTH_PASSPHRASE, MCP_JWT_SECRET and MCP_NO_AUTH from the environment. Give it a token scoped to the least it needs — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling it with your credentials.
How does Obsidian Multivault run?
It speaks stdio and streamable-http, so it runs as a local process your client starts. It is published on npm as obsidian-multivault-mcp at 1.0.0.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (a1dc25ee8f62), read on 2026-10-08. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.