PyatsSAFE
An MCP Server for pyATS (experimental)
Overview
From the repository's own README, as read at the audited commit. Badges and raw HTML are left out.
[](https://archestra.ai/mcp-catalog/automateyournetwork_pyatsmcp)
[](https://codeguilds.dev/packages/pyats-mcp)
Cisco pyATS and Genie already know how to talk to a network — parsing show commands, pushing configuration, learning feature state, running declarative tests. What they didn't have was a way for an AI agent to drive any of it directly. This server closes that gap: it wraps pyATS/Genie as a set of structured, guarded MCP tools that an agent like Claude can call against a real testbed, over the Model Context Protocol's current Streamable HTTP transport.
Point an agent at it and it can look up a device, run and parse a show command, apply configuration with a rollback point, learn and diff a feature's state before and after a change, fan a command out across a fleet — one thread pool or one process per device — run a declarative Blitz or Robot Framework test, or call a device's REST/RESTCONF API directly. Every risky path is guarded before it reaches a device, and every call lands in an in-memory audit log the agent can review mid-session.
At a glance
- Transport — Streamable HTTP (
mcp>=2.3.0), stateful or stateless, chosen with one environment variable. STDIO is gone. - 26 tools across discovery, show commands, configuration, Genie learn/diff, Genie Clean, declarative testing (Blitz, Robot Framework, AEtest), generic REST/RESTCONF, and Cisco XPresso.
- Two ways to fan out a command across many devices — a shared thread pool for everyday use, or one OS process per device (
pyats.async_.pcall) when you want real isolation at scale. - Guardrails, not honor systems — dangerous commands are blocked before they reach a device, Genie Clean can never run a stage that reboots or reimages one, and destructive actions require an exact co
9f547c7af53dOBSERVED · 2026-10-07Connect
Built from this server's own package name, version and transport as found in its source — not copied from anyone's documentation, so it cannot drift against a page we do not control. Replace the environment placeholders with a token scoped to the least it needs.
claude mcp add pyats-mcp --env XPRESSO_API_TOKEN=${XPRESSO_API_TOKEN} -- uvx pyats-mcp{
"mcpServers": {
"pyats-mcp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"pyats-mcp"
],
"env": {
"XPRESSO_API_TOKEN": "${XPRESSO_API_TOKEN}"
}
}
}
}Exposed tools (26)
20 read · 6 write · 0 destructive.
| Tool | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|
pyats_clean_device | read | |
pyats_configure_device | read | |
pyats_configure_devices_multi | read | |
pyats_configure_with_diff | read | |
pyats_device_health | read | |
pyats_diff_learned_snapshots | read | |
pyats_find_interface_by_ip | read | |
pyats_get_neighbors | read | |
pyats_get_operation_log | read | |
pyats_learn_feature | read | |
pyats_list_devices | read | |
pyats_pcall_configure_devices | read | |
pyats_pcall_show_command | read | |
pyats_ping_from_network_device | read | |
pyats_rest_request | read | |
pyats_rollback_config | read | |
pyats_run_blitz | write | |
pyats_run_dynamic_test | write | |
pyats_run_linux_command | write | |
pyats_run_robot | write | |
pyats_run_show_command | write | |
pyats_run_show_command_multi | write | |
pyats_search_devices | read | |
pyats_show_logging | read | |
pyats_show_running_config | read | |
pyats_xpresso_request | read |
Trust audit
SAFEgrade B · trust 89/100 Nothing in the source contradicts what it says it does. Grade A is reserved for packages that have also passed the behavioural sandbox.
| Layer | What it checks | Result |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | Provenance & inventory | PASS |
| L1 | Static analysis of the code | PASS |
| L2 | Instruction surface (what it tells the agent) | PASS |
| L3 | Class-specific surface | PASS |
| L4 | Behavioural (sandbox) | SKIPPED |
What the source does
- Filesystem
- declared (5 observation(s))
- Network
- none-observed
- Shell
- none-observed
- Dependencies
- not all pinned
- Secrets in source
- none-found
Findings (3)
pytest, pytest-cov, pytest-asyncio, black, isort, flake8, mypy
setuptools, mcp, pydantic, python-dotenv, requests
Every device in your `testbed.yaml` uses `%ENV{VAR}` substitution, so credentials and connection details are read from `.env` at runtime.Gates applied: no_behavioural_pass.
9f547c7af53dfull audit observations/trust-audit/mcp-server/automateyournetwork__pyats.json · Report an issue / request a re-scanAudit history
Every audit this server has had. A grade with a past is a grade somebody is still checking.
| Date | Source | Verdict | Grade | Score | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-07 | 9f547c7af53d | SAFE | B | 89 | first audit |
Questions
What is the Pyats MCP server?
An MCP Server for pyATS (experimental)
What tools does Pyats expose?
26 in total: 20 read-only, 6 that write, and 0 that can delete or overwrite. Every one is listed on this page with its risk.
Is Pyats safe to connect to an agent?
The audit found nothing in the source that contradicts what it says it does, and graded it B (89/100). Grade A is held back for packages that have also passed a sandboxed behavioural run, which is why a clean server reads B.
What credentials does Pyats need?
It reads XPRESSO_API_TOKEN from the environment. Give it a token scoped to the least it needs — an agent that can be talked into calling a tool can be talked into calling it with your credentials.
How does Pyats run?
It speaks streamable-http, so it runs as a service you connect to over the network. It is published on PyPI as pyats-mcp.
How current is this page?
The grade is for one exact copy of the source (9f547c7af53d), read on 2026-10-07. The repository is watched and re-audited when it changes.